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Federal Criminal Discovery
Reform: A Legislative Approach
by Bruce A. Green*
Suppose that federal prosecutors have conducted an investigation
culminating in an indictment. Although the prosecutors believe that
they have enough evidence to secure a conviction and are personally
convinced that the defendant is guilty, some of the evidence they have
collected is favorable to the defendant, because it tends to show that the
defendant is innocent or that prosecution witnesses should not be
believed. Must prosecutors disclose the favorable evidence to defense
counsel to use in investigating, advising the defendant, plea negotia-
tions, or trial? Under current federal law, the answer is generally "no."
Unless favorable evidence falls within one of several narrow categories,
or the evidence might be probative enough to produce an acquittal,
federal prosecutors can keep it to themselves.1
Proponents of broader federal criminal discovery law express two
principal concerns about prosecutors' existing disclosure obligations. The
most crucial one is that disclosure is now too limited to ensure fair
outcomes and provide a fair process in criminal cases.2 The other is
that prosecutors do not universally comply even with their existing
obligations,3 whether because of the vagueness, inconsistency, or
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School of Law. My thanks to Patrick Longan for inviting me to the Mercer Law School
Symposium for which this Article was prepared; James Fleissner and Peter Joy for their
generous comments on the draft presented at the Symposium; and the Mercer Law Review
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1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part ll.B.1.
3. E.g., Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, and Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, Comm. on
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 5, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from
Thomas M. Susman] ("Unfortunately, the type of conduct at issue in the highly publicized
criminal case against former Senator Stevens is not a rare occurrence.... ."); see also infra
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complexity of the discovery law4 or because of the failings of individual
prosecutors or their offices.5
Federal law governing prosecutors' disclosure obligations comes from
various sources, and so additional obligations might be adopted in
various ways. The Supreme Court might read the Constitution more
demandingly;6 the federal judiciary might augment discovery under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure' or under local rules;8 or federal
courts might enforce ethics rules calling on prosecutors to disclose
favorable evidence and information.9 In general, the Department of
Part ll.B.1.
4. See, e.g., Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, The Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created
a Conflict Between Ethics and the Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1729,
1734-35 (2012) (remarking on the complex authorities from which prosecutorial disclosure
derives); Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and Jailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 593,
599 (2007) (noting the difficulty in defining "materiality").
5. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office, 31
CARDozo L. REV. 2089,2091-93 (2010) (examining reasons why prosecutors fail to disclose);
Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 687-89
(2006) (discussing Brady as a failure of discovery doctrine).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,698 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
Once the prosecutor suspects that certain information might have favorable
implications for the defense, either because it is potentially exculpatory or relevant
to credibility, I see no reason why he should not be required to disclose it. After
all, favorable evidence indisputably enhances the truth-seeking process at trial.
And it is the job of the defense, not the prosecution, to decide whether and in what
way to use arguably favorable evidence. In addition, to require disclosure of all
evidence that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant would
have the precautionary effect of assuring that no information of potential
consequence is mistakenly overlooked.
Id.
7. See ROBERT M. CARY ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 426-27 (2011) (quoting
District Judge Sullivan); Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure
of Favorable Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 93 (2004) [hereinafter ACTL Report]; FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A SUMMARY OF
RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMIrEE ON CRIMINAL RULES (2011) [hereinafter FJC Report]; see generally
United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171-73 (D. Mass. 2009) (discussing proposed
amendment of Rule 16 and Department's successful opposition).
8. See, e.g., M.D. ALA. CT. R. 16.1(a)(1XB), available at http://www.almd.uscourts.gov/
docs/lorules.pdf (requiring disclosure of "[aill information and material known to the
government which may be favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilt or punishment,
without regard to materiality, within the scope of Brady v. Maryland"); S.D. ALA. CT. R.
16.13(b)(1)(B), available at httpJ/www.als.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/local-rules.pdf
(same); N.D. FLA. CT. R. 26.3(D)(1), available at http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/forms/Court
%20Rules/local_rules.pdf (same).
9. See United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232 (D. Nev. 2005); In re Matter
of Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 679-80 (N.D. 2012) (holding that Rule 3.8(d) requires the
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Justice has opposed the expansion of defendants' discovery rights in any
of these directions.' °
Another possible route to reform-federal legislation-is currently
being explored. Last year, Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska proposed
the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012," which would
generally require federal prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence to the
accused. 12  The proposal came largely in response to the disastrous
federal corruption prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska.
In that case, the defense team discovered after the jury's guilty verdict
that prosecutors had suppressed important exculpatory evidence, which
led the court to dismiss the charges with the government's consent and
instigate an investigation of the prosecutors. 3 The proposed congres-
sional response seems to call for only a modest expansion of prosecutors'
disclosure obligations, and to be far less demanding than the "open file"
discovery required by law in some states and employed by some state
and local prosecutors as a matter of discretion. 4 Nonetheless, the
disclosure of favorable evidence without regard to materiality, and that negligent
nondisclosures are sanctionable); ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 09-454 (2009); see generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors' Ethical Duty of
Disclosure In Memory of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 57 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Video recording: Ensuring that Federal Prosecutors Meet Discovery
Obligations: Hearing on S. 2197 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. (2012)
[hereinafter SJC Hearing] (on file with S. Judiciary Comm.) (noting statement of James
M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of J., to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, E.D. Cal. (June 5, 2007) [hereinafter Letter from Paul J. McNulty].
11. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2d Sess.
2012).
12. Id. § 2.
13. Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the
Court's Order, dated Apr. 7, 2009, In re Special Proceedings, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS
(D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), available at http:/legaltimes.typepad.com/ffiles/Stevensjreport.pdf
[hereinafter Schuelke Report].
14. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2012), available at http'//www.NCleg.net
("Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order: The State to make available to the
defendant the complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and
prosecutors' offices involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution
of the defendant."); FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.220(b)(1), available at http://www.floridabar.org
("[T]he prosecutor shall... disclose to the defendant... a list of the names and addresses
of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant .... [and]
the statement of any [such] person .... [plus other information such as that which] has
been provided by a confidential informant ... whether there has been any electronic
surveillance ... reports or statements of experts ... and any tangible papers or objects
that the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial and that were not
obtained from or that did not belong to the defendant."); see generally Robert P. Mosteller,
Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical
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Department of Justice dispatched its second highest ranking representa-
tive, Deputy Attorney General James Cole, to testify against the bill.'5
This Article discusses the proposed legislation and various arguments
that might be made for and against it. It begins by briefly discussing
the current scope of federal criminal discovery. It then describes the
legislative proposal and the competing testimony of its sponsor and the
Deputy Attorney General at the initial hearing concerning it. Finally,
in the context of a recent federal criminal case raising disclosure
questions, this Article addresses some of the fundamental issues raised
by the legislation.
I. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A. Federal Criminal Discovery Under Current Law
As many others have noted, the limited scope of discovery in federal
criminal cases cannot easily be reconciled with the liberality of discovery
in modern civil litigation."6 In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, civil litigators could play their cards close to the vest by
interviewing witnesses who were willing to talk to them, gathering
documents and physical evidence, using favorable evidence and
information to their advantage at trial, and keeping unfavorable
evidence and information to themselves. 7 Contemporary civil proce-
Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257,306-09 (2008) (arguing
that open-file discovery is the best remedy to ensure constitutional obligations are met and,
more importantly, ensuring fair criminal trials); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1153-54 (2004) (suggesting that open-file discovery is
the most appropriate way to allow defense counsel to effectively fulfill its duty to
investigate).
15. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
16. See United States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting the
differences between civil and criminal discovery obligations); Richard M. Strassberg &
Yvonne M. Cristovici, Criminal Discovery: Reform to Level the Playing Field?, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 14, 2010, at 1, available at httpJ/ NYLJ.com ("The difference in the discovery require-
ments between criminal and civil litigation has long been the subject of heated debate
among attorneys, judges and legal scholars. The more limited disclosure in criminal cases,
when a defendant's liberty is at risk, stands in marked contrast to the fulsome disclosure
afforded parties in a civil litigation, when only money is typically at issue.").
17. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1002 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the history of civil procedure prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum
Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 693-94 (1933) (requiring a collateral proceeding to compel
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dure rules, however, afford litigants relatively easy access to relevant
evidence and information in the other side's possession as well as
opportunities to acquire relevant evidence and information from third
parties.1 8 Parties can obtain relevant information from opposing
parties and witnesses through interrogatories, depositions, document
requests, and subpoenas, resulting in parties having relatively liberal
access to each other's facts, witnesses, and documents. 9 Lawyers can
still keep their strategies and mental processes secret, but not their
evidence. 0
The liberality of civil discovery grows out of an essential premise of
adversarial proceedings, which is that the truth will emerge through a
contest in court between parties who present the best evidence for their
respective positions.2 Parties build their cases "brick by brick" through
the presentation of relevant evidence that, taken as a whole, constructs
their theories of the case. 2 Unlike in inquisitorial systems, where
judges take an active role in the fact-finding process,' judges and
jurors in an adversarial system evaluate evidence that the lawyers
gather and present but they cannot look for more on their own. 4
Consequently, when parties lack access to favorable evidence, the
fairness and reliability of the adjudication is called into question.
Liberal discovery is considered essential to enable the parties to present
their best cases as well as to enable them to make informed settlement
decisions.
discovery of critical documents and testimony).
18. 2-15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 15.03 (2012).
19. Id. §§ 15.20-.28.
20. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399-400 (1981); see also FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3).
21. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
80 (1949).
22. United States v. Kott, No. 3:07-cr-0056JWS, 2007 WL 2493480, at *2 (D. Alaska
Aug. 29, 2007) ("Federal Rule of Evidence 401 requires no more for the admission of the
evidence [than that it be relevant]. It may be that under all the facts and circumstances
that may emerge at trial such evidence would not be very persuasive, but evidence does
not have to be determinative to be relevant. Reasonable doubt, like the government's own
case, is built brick by brick.").
23. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1261-62 (2005);
Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277, 296-98
(2004).
24. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356-58 (1966) (reversing convictions where
the jury had outside knowledge of alleged facts due to heavy publicity); MODEL RULES OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.11(A)(1) (2007) (requiring that judges disqualify themselves if they
have personal knowledge of facts independent of the proceedings).
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In the federal criminal process, in contrast, a "sporting" approach still
prevails.' Before trial, the government has no obligation to tell the
defense with whom the prosecution has spoken, who has relevant
testimony, or who the prosecution will call as witnesses. The defense
cannot depose witnesses to gather relevant information on its own. The
defense lacks the investigative tools and, in most cases, the funds to try
to replicate the government's investigation. Consequently, the govern-
ment may acquire substantial evidence, including exculpatory evidence,
that the defense cannot see before trial, and even much that the defense
will never see. Although state laws vary, many states provide the
defense far greater access to evidence. In many states, for example, the
defense is entitled to a list of witnesses."6 In some, the defense is
entitled to the entire prosecution file27 or to an opportunity to depose
witnesses before trial.2 s
This is not to say that the defense is left empty-handed in federal
criminal cases. As a constitutional minimum, the United States
Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland,' and a line of decisions
following it, that the prosecution must disclose certain "material"
evidence and information that is favorable to the accused-that is,
certain evidence and information that either exculpates the defendant
or impeaches prosecution witnesses. ° Insofar as the material evidence
25. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L. REV. 279,279 (1963) (addressing whether the law should "extend
to criminal prosecutions the civil pre-trial discovery techniques which force both sides of
a civil law suit to put all cards on the table before trial" or whether we shall "continue to
regard the criminal trial as 'in the nature of a game or sporting contest' and not 'a serious
inquiry aiming to distinguish between guilt and innocence'") (quoting Glanville Williams,
Advance Notice of the Defence, 1959 CRiM. L. REV. 548, 554 (1959)); see also ELIHU ROOT,
PUBLIC SERVICE BY THE BAR 12 (1916) (procedural rules advantaging the more skillful
lawyer "make litigation a mere sporting contest between lawyers").
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(a) (West 2012); FLA. R. Clum. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A); ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 412(a) (West 2010); MICH. COURT R. 6.201(AX1); N.J. R. GOVERNING
CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(c); PA. CODE R. 573(BX1).
27. See supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRM. P. 3.220(h); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 412(a); N.J. R.
GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-2(a).
29. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
30. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (holding that to raise a Brady
violation a defendant need only show that "the reason for his failure to develop facts in
state-court proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant evidence"); Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-82 (1999) (noting favorable evidence may either exculpate or
impeach); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (requiring that non-disclosed evidence
be considered in its entirety and if its suppression has a "'reasonable probablility'" of
changing the result, it is material) (quoting U.S. v. Bagley, 472 U.S. 667, 682 (1985));
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (holding that material evidence is anything
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is useful only for impeaching prosecution witnesses, and not otherwise
for establishing a defense, the prosecution may wait until trial to
disclose it.3
Brady and subsequent decisions limit prosecutors' constitutional
obligation in various ways,32 but the "materiality" element is the most
significant limitation on the disclosure duty. The Supreme Court has
explained materiality somewhat differently in different opinions, but
essentially, at least for purposes of appellate review, the Supreme Court
has said that evidence is not material unless it might have tipped the
balance between a conviction and an acquittal,33 or, to put it slightly
differently, unless the government's suppression of the evidence
that raises a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt). Evidence useful solely to impeach
witnesses is conventionally referred to as "Giglio material" after Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
31. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002). The conventional understanding
is that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed prior to trial so that the defense can use it
in formulating strategy and investigating the case. See, e.g., United States v. Pollack, 534
F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (asserting Brady material must be produced "at such a time
as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and
presentation of its case"). Belated disclosure, however, will not ordinarily result in the
reversal of a conviction unless the court finds that the defense was prejudiced as a result.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Warren, 454 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (deciding defense
was not impaired by untimely disclosure), and United States v. Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 777
(9th Cir. 1993) (stating defendant was "not materially prejudiced"), with Miller v. United
States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1112 (D.C. App. 2011) (deciding defense was prejudiced by
prosecution's failure to disclose until the night before opening statements that eyewitness
stated the shooter was left-handed, which defense would have used to prove the innocence
of the right-handed defendant).
32. See, e.g., DA's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 85-86 (2009)
(restricting the disclosure obligations of Brady to a pre-conviction trial right); California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) (limiting disclosure to evidence that the
prosecution exclusively possesses); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1977)
(deciding that Brady does not warrant general discovery).
33. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870 (2006) (holding that evidence is
material "'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different'") (quoting Greene, 527 U.S.
at 280); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 ("A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is
accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression'undermines confidence
in the outcome of the trial.'") (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 682); Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682 (noting that a new trial must be granted "if 'there is a reasonable probability that...
the result of the proceeding would have been different'" if the favorable evidence had been
produced) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,694 (1984)); see alsoAgurs, 427
U.S. at 112-13 ("[T]he omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If
there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional [evidence] is
considered, there is no justification for a new trial."). But see Greene, 527 U.S. at 300
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing the materiality standard
should be more than "reasonable probability").
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"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' One could take
the view that, like a "harmless error" standard, materiality is only a
standard of post-conviction review-that is to say, that prosecutors must
disclose all favorable evidence in connection with a trial but that
afterwards a conviction will not be overturned unless, in hindsight, the
withheld evidence was material.3" Some lower courts read the Brady
line of cases this way.36 But most lower courts interpret the Supreme
Court decisions to permit prosecutors to withhold favorable evidence
unless it is material.37 This is how the Department of Justice reads the
high court's opinions as well.3"
If materiality is regarded as the pre-trial as well as the appellate
standard, then a federal prosecutor who seeks merely to abide by the
constitutional minimum must predict before trial what a court will say
after trial about the utility of favorable evidence in the government's
possession. The question will be whether, later viewing the favorable
evidence in the context of the trial evidence, a court will conclude that
34. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("A 'reasonable
probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary
suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S.
at 678)).
35. Some discussions about the import of the materiality requirement are simply
confusing. For example, in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding Senator
Murkowski's bill, the American Civil Liberties Union has expressed the view that Brady
"recognized a defendant's fundamental right to any and all favorable information that
might prove he or she is innocent of a crime," but then characterized the case as
establishing "a constitutional obligation for the prosecution to disclose any material
evidence favorable to the accused." Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Washington Legis.
Office, Am. Civil Liberties Union, and Jesselyn McCurdy, Senior Legis. Counsel, Am. Civil
Liberties Union, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
and Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
(Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ACLU letter] (emphasis added). Defendants' purported right
to "any and all favorable information" cannot logically be reconciled with prosecutors'
purported obligation to disclose only "material evidence favorable to the accused." Id.
36. For decisions holding that prosecutors must disclose all favorable evidence without
regard to materiality, see United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2005);
United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005); United States v.
Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Ca. 1999). For commentary criticizing these
decisions, see Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POLY
REV. 415 (2011) (arguing stare decisis demands that courts not follow the path of Sudikoft).
37. E.g., United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 506-07 (1st Cir. 2010); United States
v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).
38. Brief and Appendices of Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of
Respondent Andrew J. Kline at 10 & n.3, Matter of Kline, Bd. Dkt. No. 11-BD-007 (2012)
("The Due Process Clause does not mandate the disclosure of non-material evi-
dence'--namely, evidence that is not reasonably likely to lead to a more favorable result
for the defendant).
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the prosecution's failure to disclose the evidence "undermine [d]
confidence in the outcome of the trial" because the evidence might have
led to an acquittal.39 Prosecutors must make that prediction before
trial without knowing precisely how its own case will unfold, what
evidence the defense will present-perhaps even what the theory of the
defense will be-and how the favorable evidence might be used by the
defense. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the prosecutor's ex ante
determination is inherently imprecise, and so "the prudent prosecutor
will resolve doubtful [cases] in favor of disclosure."' The Department
of Justice internal guidelines on discovery similarly encourage federal
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure.41 But there are reasons
why not all prosecutors do so,42 including their natural human tenden-
cy to minimize the significance of evidence inconsistent with their belief
in the defendant's guilt.4"
In federal proceedings, the government's constitutional obligation is
supplemented by federal statutes,"' criminal procedure rules,45 and,
in some judicial districts, by local district court rules.46 Under Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in part to prevent unfair
surprise, the government must disclose various other items pre-trial: the
defendant's statements and prior criminal record; documents and other
39. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
40. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.
41. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html.
42. For example, in Connick v. Thompson, the New Orleans prosecutor's office conceded
that its policy was to attempt to comply with its Brady obligations without disclosing more
than the law requires. 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1377 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Connick's
Brady policy directed prosecutors to turn over what was required by state and federal law,
but no more.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. For discussions of the potential influence of cognitive biases on prosecutorial
disclosure practices, see Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and
Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475, 479 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2464 (2004); Alifair S. Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481 (2009); Nathan A. Frazier, Note, Amending for
Justice's Sake: Codified Disclosure Rule Needed to Provide Guidance to Prosecutor's Duty
to Disclose, 63 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2011). For discussions on how office culture and other
external influences shape prosecutors' disclosure decisions, see Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce
A. Green, Prosecutors'Ethics in Context: Influences on Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS
IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269-92 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn
Mather eds., 2012).
44. E.g., 18 U.S.C § 3500 (2006).
45. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
46. See supra note 8; see also FJC Report, supra note 7 (summarizing the local rules
that govern prosecutorial disclosure of evidence).
MERCER LAW REVIEW
tangible items that were taken from the defendant, will be used in
evidence by the government, or are material to the defense; and
examination and laboratory reports that the government will use or that
are material to the defense.47  And, under the Jencks Act,4 if and
when the case goes to trial, the prosecution must disclose some of the
prior statements of its witnesses.49 None of the federal statutes and
rules require prosecutors generally to disclose favorable evidence or
information, however. Courts cannot enforce internal Department of
Justice guidelines that encourage federal prosecutors to go beyond their
legal obligations or provide a remedy when federal prosecutors fail to do
so, 60 and, at least in some jurisdictions, individual federal judges
cannot exercise supervisory authority to require federal prosecutors to
disclose more than the law requires. 1
Consequently, the law leaves a class of information that the federal
government may withhold, even though defense lawyers would regard
the information as important in counseling the defendant, preparing for
trial, and presenting a defense. At trial, the prosecution will introduce
some of the additional information-namely, evidence that tends to
establish the defendant's guilt. But the defense may never get its hands
on other information-exculpatory information-that might have been
introduced by the defense or led to other evidence that the defense could
have introduced. If the information is not a potential game-changer,
then the prosecution never has to disclose the information.
One might argue that keeping the defense in the dark serves to level
the playing field, since the defense is even more limited in what it must
provide to the government by way of discovery. But the government
would be hard-pressed to defend the discovery regime based primarily
on the prosecution's interest in fairness or equal treatment, given not
only the dominant interest in preventing wrongful convictions 2 but
also the prosecution's superior investigative resources and, as a
consequence, its ordinarily superior access to evidence and informa-
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2005); United States
v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000); see also SJC Hearing, supra note 10
(statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (discussing the
guidelines).
51. E.g., Coppa, 267 F.3d at 135; Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2000).
52. This is reflected in prosecutors' burden to prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
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tion.5" The government typically relies instead on other arguments
against expanding discovery-primarily, the need to protect public safety
and prevent obstruction of justice, and secondarily, the need to limit the
administrative burden on prosecutors. A key question for those
considering the proposed legislation is whether the accused individual's
interest in procedural fairness might ever be outweighed by countervail-
ing considerations such as these and, even if so, which way the balance
ordinarily should be struck.
B. The Proposed Legislative Expansion of Defense Discovery Rights
1. Discovery Issues. Discussions about federal criminal discovery
raise four major issues. 4 They are: (1) the scope of discovery-namely,
what federal prosecutors should have to turn over and what they can
withhold; (2) the timing of disclosure-that is, when before or during
trial must discoverable information be disclosed; (3) whether the
defendant may waive the statutory right to receive evidence and
information; and (4) the consequences of the prosecution's violation of
the statutory right.55 New federal legislation may expressly resolve all
of these issues or leave some of them to judicial interpretation.
The scope of discovery is the big issue. One way to frame the
question, in general terms, is whether (subject to exception) defendants
should receive (1) nothing more than current law provides, (2) all
favorable evidence in the prosecution's custody and control, or (3) more
broadly, all relevant evidence in the prosecution's custody and control,
regardless of whether it helps or hurts the defense. The position of the
Department of Justice is that the present law strikes the optimal
balance between competing interests, and therefore no legislative
expansion of defendants' discovery rights is warranted.56 At the other
end of the spectrum, a right to all relevant evidence would be most
consistent with the approach in civil litigation. It would maximize the
defendant's interest in making a well-informed decision whether to plead
guilty and, if the defendant went to trial, it would maximize the
53. See Brennan, supra note 25, at 292 (questioning the soundness of the premise that
the limitation on prosecutorial disclosure is justified by the defendant's "constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination [that] prevents discovery being a two-way street").
54. See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 1321 (2011) (identifying various key issues).
55. Id.
56. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
649
MERCER LAW REVIEW
defendant's ability to present an effective defense. 7 The middle ground
is a right to all favorable evidence-not just "material" favorable
evidence, as constitutional decisions provide. While defendants would
not get to see all of the prosecution's proof unless and until they go to
trial, they would at least be able to defend themselves more effectively
if they go to trial by presenting relevant evidence of which they might
otherwise not have known. One might also, of course, take a more
nuanced approach-for example, by distinguishing among types of
relevant or favorable evidence, as Rule 16 currently does, and providing
for disclosure of some categories of information but not others. Most
obviously, legislation might expand access to "exculpatory" as distin-
guished from "impeachment" evidence.
The second question-the question of timing-may be the thorniest
issue.58 There is broad agreement that, prior to trial, prosecutors
should provide the exculpatory evidence to which defendants are
entitled. The Department of Justice distinguishes evidence that is useful
only to impeach prosecution witnesses. In federal proceedings, there is
currently no statutory right to a list of all prosecution witnesses. The
Jencks Act requires disclosure of prosecution witnesses' prior statements,
but not until the witnesses testify. The prevailing understanding is that
"Giglio material"--material evidence and information useful for impeach-
ing witnesses-similarly need not be disclosed until trial. The practice
in some jurisdictions is to provide Jencks Act statements .and Giglio
material shortly before witnesses testify and, in others, to provide this
material shortly before trial. The effect of disclosing impeachment
material significantly earlier, such as within a short time after
indictment, would be to disclose witnesses' identities far sooner than
necessary and, in cases that would have resulted in a pre-trial guilty
plea, unnecessarily. The Department of Justice publicly sees early
disclosure as a threat to witnesses' safety.59 The Department may also
perceive this practice as contrary to its strategic interests, insofar as it
provides defense lawyers an opportunity to investigate and to prepare
the defense more effectively as well as to advise their clients against
57. Cf Robert M. Cary, Exculpatory Evidence: A Call for Reform After the Unlawful
Prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens, 36 LITIG. 34 (2010) (advocating open-file discovery).
58. See Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1427 (2011); see also Kevin C. McMunigal,
Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651
(2007); Schimpff, supra note 4; Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional
Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643 (2002).
59. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Atty Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
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pleading guilty when impeachment material exposes unexpected
weaknesses in the government's proof.
The waiver question grows out of the timing question. Insofar as
defendants are entitled to certain information, may they voluntarily
relinquish their discovery right, whether explicitly in exchange for a
lenient plea agreement or implicitly by pleading guilty before disclosure
becomes due? The current understanding is that a guilty plea has the
effect implicitly of waiving the right to Giglio material. 60  Further, it
is not uncommon for prosecutors to require defendants to waive all
disclosure rights, including the right to material exculpatory evidence,
as a condition of a favorable plea agreement.61 A 2009 American Bar
Association (ABA) ethics opinion interpreting Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct (Model Rule) 3.8(d)62 concluded that the disclosure obliga-
tion under the model rule may not be relinquished by the accused. No
state court, however, has yet considered whether to adopt this reading
of a state ethics rule based on Model Rule 3.8(d). Prosecutors-and
probably many defense lawyers-would regard the right to discovery as
something that might legitimately be bargained away.
Finally, there is a question of what, if any, consequences should follow
a failure to comply with a discovery obligation. Under current federal
law, when a discovery violation under Brady, Rule 16, or the Jencks Act
is discovered before or during a trial, the trial court generally has
discretion to provide an appropriate remedy, such as a delay or
adjournment of the trial to enable the defense to respond or, in an
extreme case, a mistrial.63 Post-trial, a court may overturn a conviction
60. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
61. The waivers may be explicit. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and
Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989); Shane M. Cahill, Note,
United States v. Ruiz: Are Plea Agreements Conditioned on Brady Waivers Unconstitution-
al?, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1 (2002); Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial
Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51
STAN. L. REV. 567 (1999). But they may also be implicit. For example, when defendants
entirely waive their right to seek appellate or other post-conviction review of their
convictions, one result is implicitly to relinquish the right to challenge suppression of
discoverable evidence. See, e.g., Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127, 174-77 (1995); Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note,An Unjust Bargain:
Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 877-79 (2010).
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2012).
63. United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 228 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that
"failure to disclose [Brady material] before trial may... require a mid-trial adjournment");
United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2007) (considering, though not
ultimately granting, a mistrial for alleged Brady violations).
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when a discovery violation may have affected the outcome." Individual
prosecutors who deliberately suppress information in violation of law
may be sanctioned personally: Michael Nifong's disbarment, in part for
withholding Brady material in the prosecution of Duke lacrosse players,
was a famous-and unusual--example.65 If the discovery standard is
established exclusively by internal Department of Justice policy,
however, the only recourse is an internal sanction.
2. The Proposed Act. The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act,
which Senator Murkowski introduced in March 2012, has its origins in
proposals made by representatives of the legal profession, including the
American College of Trial Lawyers almost a decade ago, to reform the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to generally require prosecutors to
disclose all evidence and information favorable to the accused.66 The
proposal was considered by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
several years ago but was not adopted.67 In general, the legislation
would modestly expand defendants' discovery rights while seeking to
protect countervailing public interests in individual cases in which they
most clearly are implicated.
Most importantly, the proposed law would expand on federal
prosecutors' duty to disclose favorable evidence by eliminating the legal
limitation that only material information must be disclosed. Building on
the constitutional floor, the Act would require federal prosecutors to
disclose information "that may reasonably appear to be favorable to the
defendant ... with respect to: (A) the determination of guilt; (B) any
64. E.g., Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (vacating a conviction where Brady
violations were found); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 (2004) (same).
65. Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Disbarred by Ethics Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2007, at A21, available at http:/www.nytimes.com/2007/0617/us/17duke.html.
66. ACTL Report, supra note 7. More recently, a working group of prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and others, which I chaired, reached a similar consensus that defendants should
generally receive all favorable evidence possessed by the prosecution. New Perspectives on
Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Group on Best Practices,
31 CARnozo L. REV. 1961,1966 (2010) [hereinafter New Perspectives]; see also Lissa Griffm,
Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 969, 997,
1004 (2012) (advocating legislation to require prosecutors to disclose "reasonably helpful
information"). The American Bar Association recently reached a similar conclusion. ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454. The most direct antecedent
for the Act, however, is a proposal of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, as Jim Fleissner discussed at the Mercer symposium for which this Article was
prepared. Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3014, Duty to Disclose
Favorable Information (2012), available at http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsse
t.aspx?id=21756&libID=21726.
67. See FJC Report, supra note 7.
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preliminary matter before the court before which the criminal prosecu-
tion is pending;, or (C) the sentence to be imposed."8 In effect, the Act
would bring prosecutors' statutory obligation in line with their ethical
obligation as written.69 The requirement would apply both to informa-
tion already in the prosecution's "possession, custody, or control" and to
information known to the prosecutors or that would be discovered "by
the exercise of due diligence."7  This would meaningfully expand
prosecutors' disclosure but would still be a far cry from an "open file"
system, since it would not afford advance notice of testimony that the
prosecution plans to introduce to prove the defendant's guilt.
The Act would also accelerate disclosure of impeachment material.
Under the Act, prosecutors would have to disclose favorable information
of which they are aware "without delay after arraignment and before the
entry of any guilty plea," and favorable information that they later
discover "as soon as is reasonably practicable."71 This is consistent
with decisions requiring pretrial disclosure of Brady material that is
exculpatory but more generous than decisions allowing prosecutors to
wait until trial to disclose evidence useful only to impeach prosecution
witnesses. To some extent, the law would have the effect of accelerating
disclosure of witness statements that, under the Jencks Act, need not be
disclosed until prosecution witnesses testify. Insofar as the statement
contains favorable evidence, its content would have to be disclosed
sooner.
The Act recognizes that in exceptional cases, defendants might
threaten or harm prosecution witnesses whose identities are disclosed.72
When prosecutors are worried about witnesses' safety, they would be
allowed to apply for a protective order to delay turning over material
that could be used to impeach a witness of whom the defense is not
already aware.73
The proposed legislation also addresses the waiver question. It
recognizes that in exceptional cases, the prosecution and defense may
have legitimate reasons to bargain over whether the prosecution will
disclose favorable evidence. Defendants would be allowed to waive their
68. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess.
2012).
69. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2007); ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454.
70. S. 2197 § 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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right to disclosure if the court determined that such a waiver was in "the
interests of justice."74
Finally, a court would have various remedies available when it found
that prosecutors violated their statutory disclosure obligation, including
postponement or adjournment of the proceedings, exclusion or limitation
of testimony or evidence, ordering a new trial, or dismissing the charges
with or without prejudice.75 In. place of the materiality standard on
appeal, the "harmless error" test would apply: a reviewing court could
not find a failure to disclose favorable information to be harmless unless
the government "demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
76
3. Hearings on the Proposed Act. The Senate Judiciary
Committee conducted a brief hearing on Senator Murkowski's bill in
June 2012 at which Senator Murkowski and federal defender Carol
Brook testified in favor of the bill and Deputy Attorney General Cole and
Professor Stephanos Bibas, a former federal prosecutor, testified against
it. 77 The dominant metaphor was a scale. The question was how to
strike the ideal balance between competing interests in procedural
fairness, which weighed in favor of disclosing information favorable to
the defense, and public safety considerations that were implicated in
some cases and weighed against disclosures. 7
Senator Murkowski set forth the rationale for the proposed legislation:
criminal defendants have an interest in a fair trial, which presupposes
a right to evidence in the hands of the government that is exculpatory
or that would show that government witnesses "might not be forthright
and truthful."79 There are countervailing interests, such as in prevent-
ing witness intimidation and protecting classified information."0
Although some would argue that the proposal "is not sufficiently
protective of the interests of defendants," and that federal prosecutors
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. SJC Hearing, supra note 10.
78. Id.
79. Id. (statement of Hon. Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senate).
80. Id.
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should "go to an open file system of discovery,"8 ' she believed the bill
maintained an appropriate balance.8 2
Deputy Attorney General Cole argued to the contrary that existing law
and internal policy set the optimal balance. He argued that Brady
reflected "a careful reconciling" of competing interests and that the
proposed legislation
would radically alter the... balance between ensuring the protection
of a defendant's constitutional rights and ... safeguarding the equally
important public interest in a criminal trial process that reaches timely
and just results, safeguard[ing] victims and witnesses from retaliation
or intimidation ... protect[ing] ongoing criminal investigations from
undue interference, and recogniz[ing] critical national security inter-
ests.83
He alluded to examples of witnesses being "intimidated, assaulted, and
even killed after their names were disclosed in pretrial discovery" and
warned that if the bill were enacted, "serious public safety risks ...
would result."' In his view, the Department of Justice adequately
promoted compliance with existing law through its internal policies and
procedures, 5 under which prosecutors were encouraged to disclose more
than the constitutional minimum as a matter of discretion.86 Even
prior to recent revisions of the policy, he asserted, instances of federal
discovery misconduct were "infinitesimally small."7
81. Id.; see also William M. Welch & William W. Taylor III, The Brady Problem: Time
to Face Reality, NAT'L L.J. (July 16, 2012) http:/www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?
id=1202562947386&THEBrady-problemTime-toface-reality_&slretum=201301123183
831 (arguing that a requirement that "favorable" evidence be disclosed is too limited, and
that prosecutors should generally be required to disclose all relevant information, including
"all interview reports and grand jury testimony subject to certain exceptions"); FJC Report,
supra note 7, at 47 (noting that many defense lawyers surveyed said that "they would like
to see an 'open file' disclosure policy incorporated in any proposed rule"); Expanded
Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Policy Review, JUST. PROJECT 2 (2007), httpJ/www.pewt
rusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorgAReports/Death-penaltyreform/Expanded%20dis
covery%20policy%20brief.pdf (recommending an open file system for all jurisdictions).
82. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Hon. Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senate).
83. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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II. EVALUATING THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. An Illustrative Case
To put the issues raised by proposed federal criminal discovery reform
in a concrete context, consider a recent United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decision, United States v. Mahaffy. The court
reviewed a securities fraud prosecution originating out of one of the
nation's premier federal prosecutors' offices--the Eastern District of New
York. 9 The central issue involved whether the prosecution should have
disclosed favorable testimony to the defense.9"
In the Mahaffy prosecution, the government accused traders at top
brokerage firms-Merrill Lynch, Smith Barney, and Lehman Broth-
ers-of giving confidential trading information to a day trading firm,
A.B. Watley, for its improper use. The trading information in question,
which concerned clients' requests to buy or sell blocks of securities, was
communicated internally within the brokerage firms by way of a system
known as squawk boxes. The defendants transmitted the squawked
information to Watley, which used it to engage in "frontrunning"-purch-
asing the same securities ahead of the other institutions in order to
profit in movements in stock prices caused by the transactions.91 The
defense theory, however, was at least three-fold: that the information
was not in fact confidential; that if it was, the defendants did not know
it; and that the defendants also did not know that Watley would
improperly use the information for frontrunning.9'
The prosecutors possessed thirty deposition transcripts from witnesses
questioned by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), which was
one among several agencies responsible for the investigation leading up
to the indictment. The prosecution trial team knew that the transcripts
contained testimony favorable to the defense because the team included
an SEC lawyer who had personally deposed many of the witnesses and
who was cross-designated as a Special Assistant United States Attor-
ney.93 Before trial, the SEC lawyer asked his colleagues whether the
government had to disclose portions of the SEC deposition transcripts to
88. 693 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2012).
89. Id. at 118-19.
90. Id. at 119.
91. Id. at 119-20.
92. Id. at 120-22.
93. Id. at 122.
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the defense under Brady v. Maryland4 and provided a deposition
excerpt that he thought might have to be disclosed.95
The deposition testimony related to all three of the defenses. Some of
the testimony was contrary to the prosecution's theory that the
information was confidential and that the defendants knew it. For
example, a high-ranking Merrill Lynch executive testified that informa-
tion transmitted over a squawk box is not confidential and that there
was nothing wrong with transmitting that information outside the firm,
and a Merrill Lynch branch manager testified that he had never heard
of a rule forbidding the broadcast of that information and that in the old
days, outsiders used to come to the office to listen in on the transmis-
sions." A Smith Barney trader testified similarly that the information
is not confidential because it is intended to be broadcast on the floor of
the stock exchange.97 Other transcripts might have helped to refute
the prosecution's theory that the defendants knew that Watley was using
the information for "frontrunning." For example, a Watley trader
testified that neither he nor other Watley traders frontran, and a
Lehman partner testified that one of the government cooperators told
him that Watley wanted the squawked information in order to take the
opposite side of trades, not to engage in frontrunning.9
The prosecutors withheld the transcripts from the defense. Evidently,
they concluded that none of the favorable testimony was discoverable
under- Brady because, in their view, it was not material and that there
was no other legal basis for disclosure.99 At the conclusion of a two-
month trial, the jury acquitted every defendant but one on every count
but one-a conspiracy to commit securities fraud charge-on which the
jury hung.100 After this setback, the prosecutor's office assigned the
94. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
95. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 122.
96. Id. at 122 n.8, 128-29.
97. Id. at 129.
98. Id. at 129-30.
99. One may infer that the prosecutors focused exclusively on their Brady obligation,
which they understood to be limited to the disclosure of favorable evidence that is
"material," and did not believe they had an independent ethical obligation to disclose
favorable evidence. Under a state ethics rule (then DR 7-103(B)), which applied to New
York's federal prosecutors (both under the McDade Amendment and under the district
court's local rules), prosecutors must disclose evidence "that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused." N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2007). But federal
prosecutors generally take the position that this state ethics rule does not mean what it
says and that, as long as the prosecutors comply with their Brady obligations, they satisfy
the ethics rule. If the Mahaffy prosecutors were aware of the ethics rule at all, they
evidently shared the prevailing view that it is toothless.
100. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 121.
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case to a wholly new team of experienced prosecutors to retry the
defendants on the remaining conspiracy charge. This new team learned
of the SEC deposition transcripts and reviewed some of them, but
decided to rely on the first team's decision rather than rethink whether
any deposition testimony had to be disclosed.1"' It did so even though
the first team made its decision that there was no material favorable
testimony in the context of what it may have regarded as a strong case,
whereas the second team was making its decision in the context of a
prosecution of a single charge on which a jury had already failed to
convict. 0 2
This time, the jury did convict on the conspiracy count. But that was
not enough for the government. After sentencing, the SEC initiated
administrative proceedings against Mahaffy, a Merrill Lynch stockbro-
ker. At that point, the more liberal approach to discovery in civil cases
applied. The SEC disclosed to Mahaffy, for use in defending against
administrative charges, all thirty deposition transcripts that the
prosecution had entirely withheld from Mahaffy in the criminal case.
The defense lawyers reviewed the transcripts, identified various
passages that would have been favorable to their defense of the criminal
case, and moved to set aside the convictions based on the prosecution's
failure to disclose Brady material. 3 The trial judge, himself a former
federal prosecutor, thought the prosecution's previous failure to disclose
the transcripts was inexplicable. 4 He concluded, however, that there
101. Id. at 123.
102. Id. at 134 n.13.
103. Id. at 118-19.
104. United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613(JG), 2010 WL 2925952, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2010). District Judge Gleeson stated:
I remain mystified by the government's failure to disclose the testimony of these
various witnesses. I see no legitimate interest served by an approach that has the
parties and the Court sifting through the transcripts of testimony taken by the
SEC after the trial has already occurred-especially when the testimony was
taken as part of the investigation that resulted in this very case. Nor do I see a
justification for the decision by the government's trial team (which did not include
any members of the team that handled the original trial) not to reconsider the
disclosure decisions made by their predecessors. The disclosure obligations
imposed by the federal rules, federal statutes[,] and the Constitution are too
important, and too easily complied with, to justify such an approach. Even if the
prosecutors are not sufficiently motivated, as they should be, by the defendants'
interest in a fair trial, one would think the government's selfish interest in the
integrity and durability of the convictions it obtains would induce it to consider
its disclosure obligations on an ongoing basis, and to err on the side of over-
disclosure unless well-grounded concerns about particular witnesses or other
investigations counsel otherwise.
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was no reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have
changed the result. °5 A Second Circuit panel disagreed and over-
turned the defendants' convictions, finding that the withheld evidence
might indeed have tipped the balance."'
B. Central Issues Raised by the Proposed Legislation
The Mahaffy prosecution provides a useful context in which to discuss
the central issues raised by the proposed criminal discovery legislation,
which essentially would require prosecutors to make pretrial disclosure
of all evidence favorable to the accused, subject to exceptions in
individual cases where the prosecution can persuade the court that
disclosure would jeopardize public safety or national security interests.
The central issues addressed below include: (1) whether to identify the
target of the proposed legislation narrowly as prosecutors' noncompliance
with Brady or, more broadly, as the fairness of the criminal process; (2)
whether discovery law aimed at the problem, however defined, ought to
reflect a balancing of competing interests; (3) if so, how much weight to
ascribe to the public safety and administrative interests that may be
jeopardized by disclosure and whether defendants' access to information
should be limited in all cases because these countervailing public
interests are implicated in some cases; (4) whether disclosure obliga-
tions, whatever their scope, should be established by law or self-imposed
by the Department of Justice; and (5) if disclosure obligations should be
established by law, which institution should determine them and by
what process.10 v
1. Identifying the Problem: Brady Compliance or Fair Pro-
cess? One threshold question is what problem federal criminal
discovery legislation should address. Identifying the problem is essential
to defining the terms of the debate between proponents and opponents
of the proposal. The Department of Justice perceives Senator Murkow-
ski's bill to be aimed at a relatively narrow problem: federal prosecutors'
occasional failures to comply with Brady. But the problem could be
described much more broadly to include the fundamental fairness of the
105. Id. at *6-7.
106. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 134.
107. As Jim Fleissner discussed at the Mercer Symposium, the Bill also raises a host
of drafting questions. The Deputy Attorney General focused on one of these, namely, the
vagueness of the definition of "favorable" evidence. As Professor Fleissner noted, one could
expect the Department of Justice to raise various other particular concerns if passage of
the Bill were to become imminent. This Article, however, focuses on basic conceptual
questions which would have to be resolved, at least implicitly, before moving on to the
details of drafting.
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federal criminal process, including guilty pleas as well as trials, when
helpful evidence is inaccessible to the defense.
a. Brady Compliance
The Department of Justice seeks to define the discovery problem
narrowly and then to minimize it. In its view, the disclosure established
by existing law is sufficient to ensure federal criminal defendants a fair
trial while also serving countervailing interests. The only problem is the
consistency of prosecutors' compliance with existing law. That is the
problem exemplified by the Ted Stevens prosecution, which inspired the
legislative proposal. The premise of the legislation, viewed from this
perspective, is that prosecutors' disclosure obligations must extend to all
favorable evidence in order to guarantee that, in the very least, they
disclose favorable evidence that is "material"--namely, highly probative.
In effect, the law would codify the Supreme Court's admonition that
prudent prosecutions should err on the side of disclosure. From this
perspective, the proposal is arguably misdirected and excessive. A little
bit more prudence would suffice.
As a cure for the occasional noncompliance with Brady, it is not clear
that the bill gets at the problem, at least insofar as one is concerned
with federal prosecutors who deliberately withhold evidence that they
know must be disclosed. Arguably, unethical prosecutors who are now
inclined to suppress material favorable evidence will, under the proposed
law, suppress all favorable evidence.' Insofar as the law is targeting
a few rogue prosecutors, the better response may not be to substitute one
standard for another one that might be equally ignored but to toughen
up on enforcement of the existing standard.1"9 As for the well-inten-
tioned prosecutors who occasionally make mistakes, one might argue the
108. This presupposition may be incorrect because the Act's broader disclosure
obligation may be harder or riskier to evade. As the volume of discoverable material
increases, the risk increases that violations will be discovered. Unethical prosecutors who
currently take the low risk that their Brady violations will be discovered may be unwilling
to take the higher risk that their statutory violations will be discovered.
109. See Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing Out of a Constitutional
Ditch: Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial Misconduct Post Thompson, 75 ALB.
L. REV. 1243, 1268-71 (2012); David Keenan et al., Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility
Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203
(2011), available at http'//www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1018.pdf; Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to Train,
Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 273, 303-11 (2012); Brian Gregory, Comment, Brady is the Problem: Wrongful
Convictions and the Case for "Open File" Criminal Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 830-33
(2012).
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new standard adds little: this problem can adequately be addressed
through better training, supervision, and internal systems coupled with
internal guidelines that call for generous disclosure to avoid close
questions.11° On the other hand, unless there are compelling reasons
for prosecutors to withhold favorable evidence, it seems hard to take
issue with proposed legislation that might reduce Brady violations, given
their cost to individual defendants and the public, as both the Ted
Stevens prosecution and Mahaffy illustrate.
The Department of Justice argues, however, that Brady violations
occur too infrequently to require a legislative fix, especially given the
harms that a broader disclosure obligation might cause. The instances
in which federal courts have set aside convictions because prosecutors
failed to disclose Brady material are, in the Deputy Attorney General's
characterization, "infinitesimal." Further, the risk of these failures,
already low by the Department's reckoning, is now being further reduced
through the revision of internal standards to encourage more generous
disclosure, through education, and through other internal measures. To
the extent that, in occasional close cases, federal prosecutors fail to
disclose Brady material, it is unlikely that an innocent person will be
convicted as a result-the evidence may at best establish reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jurors. For example, in Mahaffy, where the
district and appellate courts reached different conclusions on whether
withheld deposition testimony might have led to an acquittal, no one
suggested that the testimony may have established actual innocence.
Legislation, the Department argues, is not needed to cure the problem
of Brady violations in gray areas.
Many defense lawyers would disagree with the Department's
characterization of the extent of noncompliance with Brady. The
frequency with which prosecutors withhold material favorable evidence
is an empirical question that is so far unanswered. Contrary to the
Department's argument, however, the infrequency of reversed convic-
tions on Brady grounds does not necessarily mean that Brady violations
are rare. There is no reason to think that, if Brady material is withheld
before trial, it will ordinarily come to light afterward and become the
110. The legislation would not preclude internal measures. The question is whether
the legislation would meaningfully augment them, thereby reducing Brady violations by
well-intentioned prosecutors who are prone to make mistakes. Generally, law-abiding
prosecutors might take the legislation more seriously than internal guidelines, since the
consequences of non-compliance would be more significant. If prosecutors make a good
faith effort to disclose all favorable evidence, as the Act would require, they might err by
not producing marginally relevant evidence but probably not by withholding material
evidence.
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subject of a post-conviction claim. Most defendants, being indigent, lack
legal or investigative resources after a conviction to look for favorable
evidence that may have been withheld. Prosecutors who intentionally
withhold material before trial, as in Mahaffy, will have no motivation to
disclose it afterward to enable the defense to file a Brady claim. The
bad prosecutor's strong motivation is to keep possible Brady material
undisclosed in order to avoid further litigation, the possible embarrass-
ment of having a conviction overturned, the risk of personal sanction,
and the burden of a retrial. Well-intentioned prosecutors who negligent-
ly failed to produce Brady material are likely to own up to their
mistakes if they realize them, but most prosecutors who overlook Brady
material before and during trial are unlikely to discover it after trial.
In Mahaffy, the evidence in question was disclosed by a civil agency in
civil proceedings on the same subject, but that was an unusual
occurrence.
111
For these reasons, among others, defense lawyers assume that public
cases of successful, post-conviction Brady claims are the tip of the
iceberg. One might be able to substantiate or refute that assumption by
auditing prosecutors' files after convictions are obtained to determine
how often Brady material contained in the files is withheld. However,
the Department has expressed no interest so far in undertaking or
allowing such an inquiry, not even for training purposes or quality
control." 2 In any event, audits would not fully answer the question,
since potential Brady material may never have been memorialized or
may be contained somewhere other than in the prosecutor's files." 3
b. Fair Process
There are indications that proponents of criminal discovery reform are
primarily seeking compliance with existing constitutional disclosure
obligations. For example, the title of the hearing on Senator Murkow-
ski's bill, "Ensuring that Federal Prosecutors Meet Discovery Obliga-
tions," implies that its objective is to promote compliance with existing
obligations, not to establish new ones. Her remarks and those of other
111. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 120.
112. See generally Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training ProsecutorsAbout Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn From Their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2161 (2010) (discussing the unwillingness of the Department of Justice to examine
its prior mistakes to correct future ones).
113. See, e.g., New Perspectives, supra note 66, at 1981 (revealing that many
prosecutors fail to fully investigate misdemeanors, abandoning potential Brady material);
Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New
Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 541, 545-46 (2006) (discussing a "common" scenario when
potentially exculpatory information was never memorialized).
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Senators reinforced the impression that Brady compliance is principally
what is at stake."4 Submissions to the Senate Judiciary Committee
in support of the bill also focused on the need to ensure prosecutors'
compliance with their Brady obligation to disclose material favorable
evidence." 5 Relatedly, commentators point to the Stevens prosecution
and other cases in which prosecutors violated their Brady obligations as
illustrations of the need for discovery reform." 6
It is by no means clear, however, that this is the right way to view the
problem. The Brady cases, with their focus on materiality, have greatly
influenced discussions of criminal discovery. But the problem addressed
by the proposed legislation is not necessarily confined to prosecutors'
noncompliance with existing law. Even if there were perfect compliance
with Brady, questions could be raised about the fairness of a criminal
process in which some defendants plead guilty without a chance to
evaluate favorable evidence and others defend themselves at trial
without being able to introduce evidence in the prosecution's possession
that would be admissible to help establish reasonable doubt.
The first problem, which was highlighted by the American College of
Trial Lawyers's proposal to reform the Federal Rules, is that the
legitimacy of criminal trials arguably requires broader disclosure than
the constitutional minimum." 7  What is at stake is both the actual
fairness of criminal trials and the extent to which they appear to be fair
to both the public and the defendant. The fairness of the trial process
depends on the assumption that the evidence favorable to each side will
be ascertained and put before the jury."' As noted previously, this
premise underlies the liberality of discovery in civil litigation."' But
this premise runs throughout the law governing adjudications.
114. SJC Hearing, supra note 10.
115. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas M. Susman, supra note 3 (conveying ABA's
conclusion "that federal legislation is needed to implement Brady disclosure duties"); ACLU
Letter, supra note 35 (maintaining that inconsistent application of materiality standard
"has created confusion for prosecutors").
116. Welch & Taylor, supra note 81 ("What makes the [Schuelke] report more valuable
is the force with which the facts prove the need for discovery reform in criminal cases.").
117. ACTL Report, supra note 7, at 94-95 ("Nothing is more essential to a fair criminal
trial or sentence than the disclosure of information favorable to the defendant in sufficient
time for the defendant to receive due process ... and effective assistance of counsel. .. ").
118. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Our overriding concern in cases such as the one before us is the defendant's right to a fair
trial. One of the most basic elements of fairness in a criminal trial is that available
evidence tending to show innocence, as well as that tending to show guilt, be fully aired
before the jury; more particularly, it is that the State in its zeal to convict a defendant not
suppress evidence that might exonerate him.").
119. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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Suppressing probative evidence is ordinarily justified only when a
significant public policy is strongly implicated. For example, case law
on the attorney-client privilege starts with the recognition that the
public is generally entitled to all probative evidence.12° Likewise,
decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule recognize
many situations in which, despite a constitutional violation, probative
evidence is admissible to promote a reliable adjudication.12' At the
same time, discussions of defense counsel's ethical and constitutional
duty to render competent representation recognize the necessity of
investigation as an aspect of competence; in other words, defense counsel
has the primary responsibility to locate witnesses and evidence helpful
to the defense. 2'
Often, however, the government is the only possible source of evidence
helpful to the defense. A century ago, when parties in both civil and
criminal cases were required to conduct their own investigations with
minimal assistance from the opposing party, one might have imagined
that requiring parties to exchange evidence would lead some lawyers to
look exclusively to their adversaries and discourage vigorous investiga-
tions, thereby reducing the amount of evidence ultimately acquired and
put before the jury.' 23 But no one would plausibly make that argu-
ment now, least of all in criminal cases, where the defense is typically
underfunded and, in any event, lacks access to witnesses and to
investigative methods comparable to the prosecution.
Indeed, a central premise of the Department's opposition to the
legislation is that the defense should be kept ignorant. Its most
persistent argument against the disclosure law is that if the defense
receives the favorable evidence in question, defendants will harm
witnesses or disclose classified information. The Department is banking
on the fact that, if the defense cannot get the information from the
120. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,395-96,399 (1981) (noting the
attorney-client privilege is an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence is
discoverable).
121. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 236-37 (1960).
122. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof A Default Rule for Indigent Defense,
40 CONN. L. REv. 85, 91-99 (2007) (discussing the difficulty defense attorneys face in
meeting these obligations); Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs:
Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2215, 2218-19 n.7 (2010) (encouraging defense attorneys to undergo a meaningful
reform of internal regulations to avoid neglect and misconduct).
123. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and
Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 820 & n.86 (2000) (discussing the strategic
problems of open file discovery for defense attorneys).
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prosecution, it cannot get the information at all. Otherwise, the
government's public policy concern would be irrelevant: there would be
the same risk to witnesses whether the prosecution produced the
favorable evidence or the defense ferreted out the information itself.
Further, from a public policy perspective, if the information was
otherwise accessible to the defense, it would be irrational for the
prosecution to insist that the defense locate the evidence on its own.
Since most defendants are indigent, most investigations are publicly
funded, and so the result would needlessly add to the public expense.
Even if defense counsel were privately retained, as is often true in white-
collar criminal cases such as Mahaffy, it would be unfair and punitive
for the prosecution to put the defense to the unnecessary expense of
pounding the pavements to locate evidence that is sitting in the
prosecution's file.""
Thus, one must start with the understanding that in federal criminal
cases there will be a universe of information that is favorable to the
defense but to which the defense has no realistic access. The informa-
tion would be admissible in court or would lead to admissible evidence.
The defense would use the evidence, if it could, to build its case 'brick
by brick." However, the jury will never see that evidence before deciding
whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absolute terms, the simple question is whether, especially when life
or liberty is on the line, this trial process can be considered fair and
reliable. Does the prosecutor's determination that the favorable evidence
is not probative enough to secure an acquittal, which may be followed in
some but not all cases by ex post judicial review, legitimize a process in
which the defense has no opportunity to introduce evidence favorable to
the accused and argue its significance? An analogous process would not
be considered fair or reliable on the civil side when only money is at
stake.125 Further, the idea that the adjudicative process can be called
124. Cf United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring a
retrial where the prosecution failed to specify which documents it would introduce to prove
insurance fraud charges: "The Government did not fulfill its obligation merely by providing
mountains of documents to defense counsel who were left unguided as to which documents
would be proven falsified or which of some fifteen burglaries would be demonstrated to be
staged.").
125. Even the meaning of fairness in this context is open to disagreement. One might
focus solely on the reliability of the result: whether the verdict corresponded to the
defendant's actual guilt or innocence. Or one can focus on the fairness of the adjudication
process: whether the procedures sufficiently promoted a reliable outcome or sufficiently
reduced the risk that an innocent person would be convicted. A process of judicial review
of favorable evidence withheld by the government, to determine whether the evidence is
significant enough to raise concerns about the outcome, might satisfy one that the result
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fair when the prosecution withholds evidence that is favorable to the
defense but otherwise inaccessible to it, is inconsistent with the premises
underlying the right to competent counsel and other bodies of law.
Wholly apart from the fairness and reliability of the trial, there is a
second concern that legislation might address: the fairness of the process
by which defendants decide whether to plead guilty or stand trial.
Among the basic duties of defense lawyers is "to consult with the
defendant on important decisions."126 No decision is more important
than whether to plead guilty. The guilty-plea and plea-bargaining
processes are now central to criminal adjudications. The overwhelming
majority of cases are resolved by a guilty plea. Effective consultation
requires providing information necessary to make a well-informed
decision. Among other things, this means that criminal defendants
should not only understand the procedural rights that they relinquish
by pleading guilty but also receive a fair assessment of the likelihood
that they will be convicted or acquitted at trial. For example, the
Supreme Court recognized last term that a defendant was denied
reasonable defense representation when his attorney misadvised him
that he would be acquitted of attempted murder because he had shot
below the belt.'27 A reasonably informed decision requires some
knowledge of the evidence no less than the law.
Under the Brady cases and other discovery law, prosecutors appear to
be authorized to withhold impeachment evidence until trial, with the
result that defendants must plead guilty without being able to use this
evidence to assess the credibility of government witnesses. Further,
prosecutors may offer incentives for defendants to plead guilty at an
early stage, before the prosecutor turns over exculpatory material.'28
The disclosure of favorable evidence before a guilty plea would enable a
defendant to make a better-informed decision.'29 Consequently, one
might question the fairness of the criminal process when defendants
plead guilty without awareness of favorable evidence, including Brady
material, which might contribute to an acquittal. Of course, the interest
is fair but not necessarily that the process is fair.
126. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). See also Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) ('Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his
counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings[,] and
laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered.").
127. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
128. Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, "Waiving" Goodbye to Rights: Plea
Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONsT.
L.Q. 1029, 1038-40 (2011).
129. See ACTL Report, supra note 7, at 116 ("[D]isclosure of favorable information
affects a defendant's plea decisions. .. ").
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in a well-informed plea would argue for even broader disclosure to
include relevant evidence, whether helpful or prejudicial to the defense.
2. The Framework for Lawmaking: Balancing?. Both Senator
Murkowski and Deputy Attorney General Cole assumed that the
question of how much disclosure prosecutors must make, in order to
serve whatever purposes are meant to be served by disclosure law,
should be determined based on a balancing: the defendant's interest in
a fair trial goes on one side of the scale, the public interests in witness
safety and national security, among others, go on the other side of the
scale, and the law should strike a fair balance between the competing
interests.13° In the Department's view, the existing law already strikes
a fair balance and has done so for a half century; indeed, the Depart-
ment asserts that lawmakers, including the Supreme Court, have
explicitly sought to strike the appropriate balance between competing
interests. The Department made essentially the same argument at
length in its earlier opposition to a proposal to expand discovery under
the Federal Rules. 3' In Senator Murkowski's view, in contrast,
striking the fair balance requires that more-but not everything in the
prosecution's file-generally be disclosed to the defense.
It is not self-evident, however, that balancing is the right way to
approach the question of how to construct discovery law. If criminal
trials are regarded as unfair when the defense is denied access to
favorable evidence in the prosecution's possession, one might conclude
that the defense should almost invariably have access to that evidence,
as a matter of principle, rather than that the interest in a fair trial
should be qualified by countervailing interests. At the very least, one
might assume that access to favorable information should be the general
rule, subject to exceptions in particular cases in which countervailing
public safety interests are implicated to a compelling extent. Consider,
for example, the unanimous Supreme Court's rejection of the President's
absolute, unqualified executive privilege claim in response to a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum in United States v. Nixon: 32
[Tihe allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstra-
bly relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of
130. See SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statements of Hon. Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senate
& James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
131. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 10 ("[Amny broader right-such as the one
currently proposed-would fundamentally alter the character and balance of our present
systems of criminal justice. .. [and] threatens to disrupt the delicate balance of interests
achieved in the [Jencks] Act ....
132. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.
A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communica-
tions of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need
for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific
and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the
administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated. 33
If denying a party access to relevant evidence frustrates the fairness
of a criminal trial, as that decision suggests, then the defendant's right
to favorable evidence in the government's hands would not be analyzed
under a balancing test.'3 It certainly would not be balanced against
merely theoretical interests that might not be implicated in most cases.
Competing interests, such as the concern for public safety implicated in
some cases, would not justify suppression of the evidence in all cases-at
least if one could identify cases in which this countervailing interest is
minimal or nonexistent. In Mahaffy, for example, no one would
plausibly argue that the witnesses who testified favorably to the defense
in SEC depositions would be significantly at risk if the defense learned
of their testimony. If a fair adjudication presupposes that the defendant
have a chance to present favorable evidence to the jury, it is hard to see
how the defendant's interest in the government's disclosure of favorable
evidence can be subject to a balancing of public interests that are not
even implicated in many defendants' cases.
Certainly, "balancing" is not the invariable approach to fair process
interests. For example, one would not say that jurors' identities should
be concealed in all cases because of the risk to their safety in some cases.
Rather, anonymous juries are limited to cases where there is a reason
for them.135 And one would not dispense with juries altogether even
in cases where there is a perceived risk to their safety. Rather, that risk
would be addressed in other ways that do not deprive the defendant of
a fair process. 16 In other words, fairness is sometimes an absolute, or
133. Id. at 712-13.
134. See id.
135. See Adam Liptak, Nameless Juries Are on the Rise in Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2002, at Al (discussing the types of cases in which juries are anonymous); Kory
A. Langhofer, Comment, Unaccountable at the Founding: The Originalist Case for
Anonymous Juries, 115 YALE L.J. 1823, 1823 (2006) (describing a case that used an
anonymous jury for defendants who "were 'extraordinarily violent' mobsters, drug lords,
and killers") (quoting Liptak, supra); Eric Wertheim, Note,Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM
L. REv. 981, 997-1001 (1986) (discussing the situations in which anonymous juries are
used).
136. For example, a judge may order sequestration of jurors if there is a risk to their
safety. E.g., United States v. Ruggiero, No. 09 CR 135(SJ)(JO), 2012 WL 1427375, at *1-2
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virtually absolute, value. Unfairness and unreliability generally are not
accepted to serve other public values.
Thus, the choice of an analytic framework for developing criminal
discovery law is inextricably bound up with one's characterization of the
problem that the law addresses. If the problem is just Brady compliance
and one imagines that the law is meant simply to establish a prophylac-
tic requirement to ensure that "material" favorable evidence is disclosed,
then balancing may make sense. It does not make sense, however, if the
defendant's access to favorable evidence is regarded as an essential
precondition to a fair trial. Further, if balancing is appropriate, how one
characterizes the problem matters to how much weight one places on the
defense side. If one thinks that favorable evidence is not absolutely
essential but does make the trial substantially more fair and reliable,
one will put more weight on the disclosure side than if one thinks that
compliance with Brady is all that is at stake.
3. The Countervailing Public Interests. The government's
opposition to discovery reform has rested on the premise that, when one
trots out the scale, the interests underlying broader disclosure will be
outweighed by two other sets of interests-public safety (especially the
security of witnesses) and prosecutors' administrative interests.
Underlying this claim is an unproven empirical assumption that these
countervailing interests would be seriously jeopardized by broader
disclosure.
a. Public Safety Concerns
The Department of Justice cites various concerns that might be
grouped loosely under the category of "public safety." One set of
concerns revolves around protecting potential witnesses from physical
harm, threats, or harassment. Relatedly, prosecutors sometimes voice
concern that disclosures of witnesses' identities, statements, or back-
ground will discourage witnesses from assisting law enforcement officials
in current or future cases. Another set of law enforcement concerns
relates to the risk that disclosures may jeopardize ongoing criminal
investigations of other individuals.
The Department does not claim that the disclosure of relevant
information, regardless of its materiality, would jeopardize public safety
in all or even most federal criminal cases, and, as Mahaffy illustrates,
such an argument would be implausible for several reasons. First, there
is nothing to suggest that witness tampering is a serious risk in all,
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012).
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most, or even many federal criminal prosecutions. Some defendants pose
a danger, but most do not. That may be, in part, because witness
tampering is a crime that law enforcement authorities can be expected
to treat especially seriously. Evidence that a defendant threatened or
harmed a witness could be used to prosecute the underlying charges as
well as a new obstruction charge. Presumably, defendants in organized
crime and gang prosecutions and their associates may be predisposed to
assume the risk by threatening prosecution witnesses, but it is
implausible to suggest that white-collar defendants like those in Mahaffy
are likely to do so.
Second, the category of favorable information that might precipitate
concerns about witness safety is limited. It is unlikely that a defendant
would threaten a witness who will provide exculpatory testimony.
Disclosing impeachment evidence would not increase the risk to
witnesses who are already known to the defense. To the extent the
proposed statute creates a risk, it is in situations where disclosure would
reveal to dangerous defendants the identity of government witnesses
who are not already known. The Bill addresses that risk by allowing
exceptions to be made when prosecutors have particular reason to be
concerned about witness safety.137 There is nothing to suggest that all
relevant evidence must be withheld because prosecutors and judges
cannot identify particular defendants who may threaten witnesses and
particular favorable information which poses a risk to witness safety.
The Bill assumes that risks can be identified and avoided through
requests for protective orders in particular cases. The Department of
Justice has not argued cogently why that is not good enough.
At bottom is an empirical question: Would there be significantly
greater danger to witnesses under the proposed statutory regime, which
generally requires prosecutors to disclose favorable information subject
to exception, than under the current legal regime, which requires
prosecutors to disclose favorable information only if it is constitutionally
material?
This question probably can be answered, because there are many state
and local jurisdictions in which prosecutors must generally produce
witness lists, all favorable evidence, or, more broadly, all evidence in
their files.' 38 In some federal jurisdictions, as a matter of local district
137. See Brennan, supra note 25, at 292 ("Where that possibility [of witness tampering]
may appear, a trial judge's discretion affords an ample safeguard.").
138. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c) ("Except as is otherwise provided in these rules
as to protective orders, the State shall disclose to defense counsel any material or
information within its possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused
as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce his punishment therefor."); N.C.
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court rule"' or simply internal practice, federal prosecutors have
conventionally disclosed all exculpatory and impeachment evidence
without regard to materiality, subject to concerns about witness safety,
the protection of ongoing investigations, and the like. 40 To date, no
one has shown that in those United States jurisdictions there is a
greater incidence of witness tampering." Nor has anyone shown that
instances of witness tampering, to the extent they occur in jurisdictions
with more liberal discovery, are attributable to the marginal increases
in disclosure of information that would not be produced in federal
criminal cases.'4 2 Notably, while the Deputy Attorney General pointed
to criminal cases in which witnesses had been harmed, he did not pin
the blame on disclosures beyond those that Brady and other federal law
now demand.143 Consequently, to the extent that disclosure require-
ments should be determined by balancing competing interests, one might
be skeptical how much weight to assign to the interest in witness safe-
ty-not because witness safety is unimportant but because there is no
reason to assume that the marginal increase in disclosure of favorable
evidence under the proposed law would increase the risk to witnesses.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2012) ("Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order...
[t]he State to make available to the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement
agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors' offices involved in the investigation of
the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant."); see also supra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
139. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
140. It should be emphasized that the current Department of Justice guidelines do not
call for as broad disclosure as the Act. The guidelines require resolving doubts about
materiality in favor of disclosure, but do not require prosecutors to disclose evidence and
information that are favorable to the defense but that clearly are not "material" in the
constitutional sense.
141. One might similarly look to the experience of foreign jurisdictions, such as
England and Canada, where more liberal discovery is afforded in criminal cases. See
Brennan, supra note 25, at 293. Further, as Peter Joy pointed out at the Mercer
Symposium, U.S. military lawyers on both sides of a criminal case share access to the
evidence.
142. In fact, empirical evidence shows the contrary. Avis E. Buchanan,. Fairer Trials
and Better Justice in D.C., WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2011 at Al ("In studies by some of the
states and cities with open-file discovery (Florida, San Diego, Philadelphia, Detroit[,l and
Newark), no causal link between the practice and witness intimidation has been found.
Notably, none of the jurisdictions with more open discovery practices has switched back to
a more restrictive practice. Instead, these jurisdictions rely on allowing prosecutors to seek
judicial intervention or protective orders on those rare occasions where discovery
disclosures might jeopardize a witness's safety.").
143. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Atey Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
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Similar doubts might be raised about the weight to be accorded to two
related public interests invoked by the government. First, the govern-
ment has alluded to witnesses' interest in privacy. Compared to public
safety, this seems less compelling, and certainly less important, than
criminal defendants' interest in fair process. Witnesses routinely give
up some privacy in civil litigation to promote fair adjudications. Why
not in criminal cases? For example, it is hard to see why the SEC
witnesses' privacy was more important in Mahaffy's criminal case than
in the administrative proceeding against him.
Second, the government refers to national security concerns. These
are undoubtedly weighty in cases where they are implicated, but the
number of federal criminal cases in which broader discovery would
jeopardize national security is almost certainly minuscule. Further, in
espionage cases and other federal cases where potentially. discoverable
evidence is classified, the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA)'4 provides a mechanism to limit disclosures. 145  It makes
little sense to suggest that all federal defendants should be denied
favorable evidence to prevent disclosure in a handful of identifiable
national-security cases, given that mechanisms already exist to protect
national security interests that arise in criminal prosecutions.
b. Administrative Concerns
Although the government's emphasis is on countervailing public safety
concerns, several administrative issues are also raised by the proposed
legislation. One question is whether the process of preserving informa-
tion for review and potential disclosure would be more burdensome
under the proposed law than under the current law. The problem
concerns information that is not presently recorded or memorialized-for
example, information conveyed by witnesses to federal investigators or
prosecutors. Under Brady, federal prosecutors must ensure that the
information is memorialized and conveyed if it is favorable and
material; 14 under the proposed law, however, far more information
will have to be memorialized. 147  At first, this may sound like an
increased burden. In all likelihood, however, there is no legitimate
reason for federal investigators, even under current law, to fail to make
a contemporaneous record of information favorable to the defendant. At
the time the information is conveyed, there is no way to know whether
the information is or is not "material"; therefore, there is as much of an
144. 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006).
145. See id.
146. 373 U.S. at 87-88.
147. S. 2197 § 2.
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imperative to record favorable information now as there will be if the Act
is passed.
Another question is whether the burden of reviewing and producing
information under the proposed statutory standard would be significant-
ly more demanding. There are several reasons to doubt that it would.
First, the time involved in gathering and reviewing material would be
no greater. In Mahaffy, for example, prosecutors had the burden to
obtain and review the SEC transcripts to ascertain both whether the
transcripts contained useful evidence for the prosecution and whether
they contained favorable information that was "material."1' The
statutory obligation to determine whether testimony was favorable
would replace the constitutional obligation to determine whether the
transcripts were materially favorable and should not be much more of
a burden. Likewise, in an electronic age, the task of producing
information determined to be favorable would not seem particularly
burdensome especially when compared with either the other pretrial
tasks performed by criminal prosecutors or when compared with the
tasks undertaken by civil litigators in discovery: if the SEC could turn
over the transcripts, federal prosecutors could as easily do so.
One might fairly argue that the statutory requirement to disclose
favorable information, like the Brady obligation to disclose materially
favorable information, would be vague and would engender confusion
and uncertainty. Sometimes, because prosecutors are inexperienced, not
sufficiently appreciative of the defense theory, or not diligent enough,
prosecutors will overlook information helpful to the defense. To protect
against this, prudent prosecutors may have to err on the side of
disclosing arguably favorable information, but that may not solve the
problem in all cases. While all this may be true, it is not to say that the
proposed statutory standard is any harder to implement than the
current constitutional standard. Perhaps some other approach, such as
an "open file" requirement, would be preferable. But the vagueness of
the Act's "favorable" standard does not argue for preferring the status
quo.
A third question is whether federal prosecutors would be significantly
burdened by having to seek protective orders in individual cases when
witnesses are at risk. The answer depends on the prevalence of such
cases and the amount of work needed to obtain a protective order when
they arise. At present, prosecutors regularly go to court for search
warrants, arrest warrants, wiretap authorizations, and other ex parte
orders. On occasion, they presently seek protective orders authorizing
148. See United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113 (2012).
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them to withhold potential Brady material to protect informants'
identities, prevent obstruction, or protect other important interests.
149
Having to seek court orders with somewhat greater frequency hardly
seems burdensome.
The fourth, and probably most significant, administrative question is
whether the proposed law would lead to significant satellite litigation
over whether prosecutors wrongly withheld favorable evidence and to
unnecessary reversals of convictions. The incentive for such litigation
is the provision that convictions will be set aside when prosecutors
withhold favorable evidence, unless the government can show that its
failure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On occasion, as in
Mahaffy, the defense will learn after trial about favorable evidence that
might have made a difference to the outcome. 5 ° Now, the defense has
an incentive to challenge the conviction on this ground only if there is
a plausible argument that the evidence was material-that is, its
absence undermines confidence in the conviction. Presumably, there will
be situations where it is not plausible to make this argument but it is
plausible to argue that the favorable evidence was not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, which is an easier burden to meet. Whether the
difference between these legal standards is great enough to make a
difference is hard to say. Additionally, there will be some cases where
courts will reverse convictions under the "harmless error" test but would
not have reversed under Brady. Some (though scarcely all) would regard
retrials in such cases as an unnecessary administrative burden, because
the retrial is unlikely to result in an acquittal and, even if it does, that
does not mean that the defendant is factually innocent.
The government may not argue about the litigation burden too
strenuously, since the argument presupposes that in a significant
number of cases, prosecutors will fail to disclose favorable evidence that
might plausibly lead to an acquittal. But even if one takes this concern
seriously, it does not raise a question about a legislative obligation to
disclose favorable evidence but raises a question only about the standard
of post-conviction review. Any perceived problem could be addressed by
preserving the proposed new disclosure obligation but maintaining the
constitutional standard for reviewing violations. Where prosecutors
withhold favorable evidence that is not material in the constitutional
sense, they might be subject to personal sanction for violating the law
but a conviction would be upheld. In sum, it seems unlikely that, under
149. See, e.g., United States v. Williams Companies, Inc., 562 F.3d 387, 396 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
150. See United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113 (2012).
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a balancing test, administrative interests will be entitled to substantial
weight.
c. Unspoken Concerns
There is a last concern that the government is unlikely to articulate
publicly but that likely animates many prosecutors' objection to liberal
discovery. It is that the defense will make effective use of the favorable
information. This might be labeled the problem of "smoke and mirrors."
The problem is that prosecutors fear that defense lawyers are able to
make convincing use of exculpatory and impeachment material to
persuade juries to find reasonable doubt even when the evidence is not
very probative as a logical matter.151 Judges look at evidence differ-
ently than juries. A judge may ascribe little legal weight to favorable
evidence when making the ex post determination of whether withheld
evidence was material, even though a defense lawyer may in fact have
been able to employ the evidence effectively. Judges presuppose rational
juries-they "exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice,
'nullification,' and the like"152-whereas many prosecutors assume that
juries are often irrational. Consequently, prosecutors may assume that
the practical effect of broader disclosure will be more acquittals, even if,
by legal definition, the additional disclosed information is not material.
Of course, this is not a concern that deserves legitimate weight.
Disclosure law cannot be predicated on the assumption that juries are
irrational. Further, if judges are misjudging the weight of evidence and
wrongly concluding that evidence would not reasonably have affected the
jury's decision, the prosecution has no right to exploit those misjudg-
ments."15
Paradoxically, some defense lawyers may also perceive, though
probably not articulate, defense interests that weigh against expanding
151. Cf U.S. Attorneys' Manual 9-5001(c) ("a trial should not involve the consideration
of information which is ... not significantly probative of the issues before the court and
should not involve spurious issues or arguments .... Information that goes only to such
matters ... is not subject to disclosure.").
152. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95 (holding that prejudice under the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, which is based on the "materiality" standard under
the Brady line of cases, must not take account of "the luck of a lawless decisionmaker").
153. Relatedly, prosecutors may be concerned that the defense will use the additional
evidence to establish reasonable doubt even when the defense's theory does not accord with
what actually occurred-in other words, that the defense will be able to suggest alternative
theories that are plausible but not true. Of course, that is precisely the objective of the
defense-to put the prosecution to its proof. It cannot be a legitimate ground for limiting
discovery that, given additional probative evidence, the defense would argue reasonable
doubt more effectively on behalf of defendants who may not be factually innocent.
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prosecutors' disclosure. One possible concern is that if prosecutors have
to disclose more, they may conduct more work on their cases, and learn
their cases better, before making plea offers. This may result in less
favorable plea offers, at least in some cases, for either of two reasons.
First, prosecutors may learn that their cases are stronger than they
initially thought. Second, a guilty plea may become less beneficial to
prosecutors in terms of saving time and resources. Moreover, defendants
who favor quicker resolutions may have to wait longer to resolve the
charges against them.
A further concern may be that the disclosure of more evidence by
prosecutors may necessitate more work by defense lawyers for which
they may not receive commensurate compensation or that may simply
be less psychologically rewarding than other aspects of their work. For
example, defense lawyers may prefer the art of cross-examining
witnesses with little information to the prospect of slogging through piles
of written material to find additional fodder for cross-examination, even
if, from the client's perspective, more information facilitates a more
effective defense.
These interests, which arise out of the practical realities of the
criminal justice process, may not seem particularly compelling as a
theoretical matter, since it is hard to argue that the criminal justice
system operates most fairly when defendants are able to exploit
prosecutors' ignorance of the evidence and limited resources or when
defense lawyers prepare less thoroughly. Nonetheless, the practical
concerns might explain why some defense lawyers may not become
enthusiastic supporters of the proposed legislation.
4. Law vs. Guidelines. The government's position is that internal
Department of Justice guidelines calling on federal prosecutors to
disclose information more generously than required by the law are
preferable to additional statutory disclosure obligations. The implication
is that prosecutors are as likely to comply with standards set forth in
Department of Justice guidelines as they are to comply with the law, but
that since guidelines are not legally enforceable, they will not engender
burdensome legal challenges. One problem with the argument, at
present, is that the internal guidelines are less demanding than the
proposed law; while encouraging prosecutors to err on the side of
disclosure when materiality is uncertain, they do not generally require
disclosure of favorable evidence subject to exception when witness safety
is at stake. But even if internal guidelines were revised to impose a
disclosure obligation identical to that of the Act, there would be reasons
to doubt their efficacy, even if one assumes, as I do, that federal
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prosecutors are generally well-intentioned and take their legal obliga-
tions seriously.
First, recent experience calls the adequacy of this approach into
question. Guidelines "'requir[ing] prosecutors togo beyond the minimum
obligations required by the Constitution and establish[ing] broader
standards for the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment informa-
tion'" have been in effect at least since 2006."5 Then-Deputy Attorney
General McNulty cited the guidelines as justification for opposing reform
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 However, these guide-
lines were subsequently violated by experienced prosecutors in the
Stevens prosecution and Mahaffy, among others. There were many
instances in recent decades in which federal discovery violations
appeared to provide object lessons in the need to do better on both
individual and institutional levels.
56
Second, common sense and experience suggest that the possibility of
judicial review encourages compliance with discovery obligations.
Prosecutors are more likely to take the obligations seriously if noncom-
pliance carries a risk of professional discipline or judicial enforcement.
Further, judicial review will allow for the interpretation of disclosure
obligations by an objective judiciary rather than by prosecutors who will
naturally be inclined to interpret their obligations through an ad-
versarial lens.
5. Institutional Choice. As discussed above, various fundamental
issues are implicated by the possibility of federal criminal discovery
reform. If one concludes that prosecutors' disclosure obligations should
be expanded, various details also would have to be resolved. Presently,
the Department of Justice opposes the proposed legislation in concept.
If there came a point where its adoption was imminent, the Department
would interpose more fine-grained objections. This raises an institution-
al choice question: Which institution and institutional process should be
employed to resolve relevant issues, great and small?
154. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 10 (quoting Memorandum from the
Deputy Attorney General of the U.S. Dep't of Justice to the Holders of the U.S. AToRNEYs'
MANUAL Tit. 9 (Oct. 9, 2006)).
155. Id.
156. For example, when the Department of Justice under Attorney General Reno began
the practice (which later administrations discontinued) of publishing disciplinary decisions
of its Office of Professional Responsibility, the first published decision was in a case where
a senior prosecutor took insufficient care to comply with discovery obligations. See Bruce
A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 86-87 (1995) (discussing the Office of Professional
Responsibility report arising out of United States v. Isgro, 43 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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Deciding whether to reform federal criminal discovery and in what
manner may initially require -resolving both empirical and policy
questions. Insofar as the focus is on compliance with Brady, the
empirical questions include how often federal prosecutors violate existing
discovery obligations, whether internal Department of Justice efforts are
adequately reducing the incidence of such violations, and whether a
broader statutory obligation will further reduce discovery failures.'57
If one seeks to determine the scope of discovery based on a weighing of
countervailing interests, additional empirical questions include the
extent to which broader disclosure leads to violence and other wrongdo-
ing directed at witnesses, and whether it is possible in advance to
identify cases or classes of cases in which the risk is significant, so that
discovery need not be curtailed in all cases to protect witnesses in
particular cases. Ultimately, answers to these questions may not dictate
a particular outcome; different lawmakers may have different intuitions
about how best to weigh fairness interests against other, countervailing
public interests.
Are the relevant empirical inquiries and policy judgments best made
by the federal courts, Congress, or internally by the Department of
Justice? If by federal courts, is the optimal process that of federal rule
making, constitutional adjudication, or the adoption of ethics rules? In
general, the Department of Justice has been unenthusiastic about
discovery reform by any institution other than itself. In its opposition
to the expansion of prosecutors' discovery obligations, it has promoted
stalemate by encouraging institutional lawmakers to defer to each other.
At different stages, it has urged the judiciary to respect the balance
struck by Congress in the Jencks Act, 58 urged Congress to respect the
balance struck by the judiciary in Rule 16,'59 urged lawmakers to
respect the constitutional balance struck by the Supreme Court in the
157. See Letter from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 10 (maintaining that discovery
reform could be justified only if there were "a well-documented case that [reform] is
necessary to solve a fundamental problem of regular false conviction of the innocent" and
that the "empirical case for change" has not been made).
158. Id. ("The proposed amendment disregards the statutory requirements of the
Jencks Act. . . which.. . represents the congressional balancing of the competing interests
of witness security and privacy with the defendant's interest in disclosure .... The
proposed rule, however, utterly disregards that balance and consigns the statute, and the
concomitant congressional balancing of interests contained in the Act, to a distant
memory.").
159. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice) (asserting that legislation is unnecessary because the judiciary's rules
committee recently "considered and rejected changes to Rule 16").
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Brady line of cases,160 urged the Supreme Court to respect the judg-
ments underlying federal legislation and rules,' and urged drafters,
adopters, and interpreters of prosecutorial ethics rules to defer to
everyone else.
16 2
In Senator Murkowski's remarks on her bill, she acknowledged that
the federal rules drafting process might ordinarily be the preferable one.
The federal judges, in the context of rule making, are capable of
gathering evidence and studying the empirical questions as legislators
might. The judges bring to bear their experience presiding over, and
reviewing, federal criminal trials, and can be expected to bring
objectivity to the task. The Senator perceived, however, that the
judiciary, in considering proposals to expand Rule 16, did not reach a
studied conclusion that current laws were optimal but caved to pressure
from the Department of Justice. 163 If the federal rule-making process
is deemed preferable,1"' Congress might stiffen the judiciary's back-
bone by directing the federal judiciary to employ that process to study
and expand defendants' discovery rights.
160. Id. ("For nearly fifty years, a careful reconciliation of [the various criminal
litigation] interests has been achieved through the interweaving of constitutional doctrine
... ."). The Department occasionally quotes the Supreme Court's observation that "[ain
interpretation of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery 'would
entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice.'"
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.7 (1985) (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 117 (1967) (Harland, J., dissenting)). It seems unreasonable to infer from this,
however, that the Supreme Court's Brady line of decisions are meant to strike the optimal
balance between fairness interests and countervailing public interests for legislative as
opposed to constitutional purposes. Rather, the Court is establishing the bare minimum
that due process requires by way of disclosure, just as its ineffective assistance of counsel
cases set the minimally acceptable standard of defense representation, as opposed to the
normative or optimal standard. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
161. Brief for the United States at 26-28, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)
(No. 01-595), 2002 WL 316340, at *26-28 (arguing that the Jencks Act and Rule 16 support
the conclusion that impeachment material should not be provided before trial).
162. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Appellee Jeffrey
Auerhahn and Affirming at 14-16, In re Auerhahn (No. 11-2206) (1st Cir. July 23, 2012);
Brief and Appendices of Amicus Curiae United States of America in Support of Respondent
Andrew J. Kline at 7-8, Matter of Kline, No. 11-BD-007 (2012).
163. SJC Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Hon. Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senate); see
also Letter from Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, D.D.C., to Hon. Richard C.
Tallman, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Apr. 28, 2009) (remarking that changes to the internal guidelines at the Department of
Justice failed to produce noticeable results and urging an amended Rule 16 that requires
more disclosure).
164. See Brennan, supra note 25, at 293-95.
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There may be advantages to proceeding legislatively, however.'65
Although Congress is not the only institution that can make law on the
subject, its determinations may command the greatest respect, given its
advantages in terms of both information gathering and, from the
perspective of democratic legitimacy, policy making. Insofar as empirical
issues are implicated, Congress is at least as capable as a judicial rules
committee of conducting hearings and other fact-gathering inquiries to
resolve them. Further, while the judiciary may feel restrained based on
separation-of-powers principles to defer to policy judgments implicit in
the Jencks Act, Congress would not be similarly encumbered.
An interesting question is whether the Department of Justice deserves
as much deference as it seeks when it suggests that internal policing
should suffice. There are some areas of conduct where federal prosecu-
tors undoubtedly deserve broad deference, such as in making discretion-
ary decisions about whom to charge and perhaps more broadly in setting
enforcement priorities. But when it comes to making rules to govern
prosecutors' professional conduct as advocates, it is hard to see why
prosecutors should deserve particular deference. They do not have a
monopoly on information and expertise relevant to deciding the optimal
scope of discovery. Nor are they particularly objective on the ques-
tion.'66 The Department's reflexive answer to any criminal process
question is likely to minimize defendants' rights. The Department
cannot claim a history of expanding defendants' procedural rights
through the exercise of self-restraint. Often, internal guidelines appear
to be adopted less out of conviction than as a strategic measure to
discourage lawmakers or courts from adopting enforceable, external legal
constraints,167 as is true here.
III. CONCLUSION
Imagine that federal criminal defendants had discovery rights
comparable to those of federal civil litigants. Following a federal
criminal indictment, the prosecution would be required to turn over all
relevant evidence in its possession except in particular cases where a
court found that certain disclosures would put witnesses at risk or
165. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965).
166. Cf Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyersin Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996)(maintaining that the Department of Justice is not the preferable body to regulate
prosecutors' communications with represented defendants, because of its lack of
objectivity).
167. E.g., U.S. ATTOINEYs' MANUAL § 9-13.000 (1997).
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otherwise jeopardize public safety or welfare. Defense counsel would
then be in a position to investigate further and to give the client a well-
informed assessment of the likely outcome of a trial. If the defendant
elected to go to trial, the defense would be in a position to take
advantage of all the available relevant evidence, building its case for
reasonable doubt piece by piece. In the ordinary criminal case where
full disclosure was made, the process and outcome would accord with the
idea of fairness underlying the civil adjudicatory system. Guilty pleas
would be well-advised, and jury verdicts would be based on consideration
of all the relevant evidence. If this is one's vision of a fair resolution of
criminal charges, then the existing disclosure law results in a process
that seems woefully inadequate. Even a process in which prosecutors
made the somewhat broader disclosures required by the proposed
"Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act" would seem to fall substantially
short.
The Brady violations in the prosecution of Senator Stevens which are
the impetus for the proposed Act turn out to be a double-edged sword.
On one hand, the case has prompted Congress to consider the adequacy
of existing federal criminal discovery law and whether it needs to be
reformed. That is all to the good. But on the other hand, discussions of
the Stevens case lead one to focus on the adequacy of the Brady doctrine
and, in particular, its materiality requirement, and to suppose that the
problem with Brady is simply the difficulty of compliance. If one looks
at the criminal discovery regime using the liberality of civil discovery as
the baseline, in contrast, one might question the fairness of the criminal
process even if invariable compliance with Brady were assured.
The Department's opposition to the Act, and to expanding prosecutors'
disclosure obligations generally, may seem reasonable if one's objective
is simply to ensure that federal prosecutors produce exculpatory evidence
and impeachment evidence that are constitutionally "material." The
Department is taking significant measures to educate federal prosecutors
and to develop a national culture in which compliance with current law
is taken seriously. One might fairly defer to the Department's judgment
that these and future measures will be effective. If one questions the
fairness of the existing disclosure law, however, and concludes that a fair
process requires greater and earlier disclosures of relevant evid-
ence-and certainly of favorable evidence-the Department's opposition
to any expansion of defendants' rights seems far less reasonable. The
interest in public safety and other countervailing interests the Depart-
ment cites, although implicated in a comparatively small number of
cases, would not seem to justify curtailing defendants' access to evidence
in all cases. There are many states, localities, and federal districts
where prosecutors make broader disclosure, subject to exceptions in
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individual cases where there are particular countervailing concerns.
Unless it finds that, contrary to these states' evident experience, more
generous disclosure demonstrably undermines public safety, Congress
should not be persuaded by the Department's opposition in principle to
discovery reform.
